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Summary findings
The outlook for economic  development  for an important  They argue that a useful  baromerer for access  to new
group of middle-income  countrirs has again been buoyed  loans is the market value of existing  sovereign  debt. It
by substantial private capital inflows  in the 1990s. As in  follows  that a quantitative analysis  of the factors that
the 1970s, this development  has been met with cautious  caused the market value of sovereign  debts to rise rapidly
optimism.  after 1989 would also improve understanding of the
It is generally accepted that these countries need  forces behind the renewed access to international capital.
resource transfers from the resc  of the world to support  Empirical historical  evidence  suggests  that fiscal
capitd formation and growth. It is also  generally  reform, privatizarion,  and debt reduction are useful in
accepted  that these private capital flows makc the  explaining relative improvements  in the standing of
allocation of resources  more efficient.  But there is  debtor countries in international credit markets.  Debtor
concem that a rapid reversal of market sentiment could  countries with strong reform programs, in other words,
impose considerable  adjustment costs on these same  are better prepared to withstand deterioration in the
economies.  external environmcnt.
Dooley, Fernandez-Arias,  and Kletzer try to quantify  But the reduction in dollar intcrest rates since 1989
what many consider to be the main reasons  debtor  appears to be the chief factor in the debtor countries'
countries have access  to capital markets again:  renewed access to international loans. The authors
•  Domestic  policy  reform in the debtor countries  estimate  the effect of increases  in dollar interest rates and
* Debt and debt service  reduction, usually  associated  conclude  thar the typical debtor country remains
with Brady Plan restrucuring.  vulnerable to increase  in interest rates that are well
Changes in the external market, such as changes in  within the rangc of recent experiensc.
interest rates in industrial  countries.
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effortin the deparunentto analyze  foreign  invesunent  in emerging  markets.  Copies  of the paper are  available  frcefrom  the World
Bank,  1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact  Sheilah  King-Watson,  room S8-125,  extension  31047 (30
pages).  July 1994.
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Stijn Claessens and Paul Armington  for helpful  comments.The  outlook  for  economiic development for  an  important group  of  middle income
countries has once again been buoyed by substantial private capital inflows in the 1990s.  As in
the 1970s, this development  has been met with cautious optimism.L  On the one hand it is generally
accepted that these countries need re-source  transfers from the rest of the world to support capital
formation and  growth.  Moreover, it  is  also generaly  accepted that  private capital flows
contribute on  a miicro  level to  efficient allocation of resources.  On the other hand, there is
concern that a rapid reversal of marker sentiment  could impose considerable  adjustment costs on*
these economies.
In  this paper  we attempt to  quantify the  factors that  have been widely cited  as the
fundamental  causes of return of market access for debtor countries.  The three broad classes of
fundmenalswe  consider include internal policy reforms in the debtor countries, debt and debt
service reduction usually associated with Brady Plan rcstructurings, and changes in the external
environment  such as changes in interest rates in industrial  countries.
We argue that a useful  barometer for access to new lending  is the market value of existing
sovereign  debt.  It follows that a quantitative  analysis  of the factors that caused the rapid increase
in market values of sovereign debts after 1989 would also provide a better understanding  of the
funametalforces  behind  the return of access to new international  capital.
The historical  evidence suggests that fiscal reform, privatization,  and debt reduction  are
useful in explaining the relative improvement  in the standing of debtor  countries in international
credit markets. Thus, debtor countries with.  strong reform programs are better prepared to
withstand  a deterioration  in the external  environment. However,  the reduction in dollar interest
rates after 1989 appears to the most important  determinant in the widespread return of debtor
countries to international  borrowing.of the experience in recent years.
IDifficulties of some debtors in recent months following  the rise of U-S. rates during early 1994, after this paper
was prepared, point in the same direction.1.  Introduction
The turnaround in the extemal financial  position of many debtor countries since 1989 has
been phenomenal. Improvement  is particularly  impressive  in countries that have completed Brady
Plan restructurng of their external debt.  In the first quarter of 1989 these countries' external debt
sold for an average price of only forty cents on the dollar and private capital inflows were largely
restricted to  concerted lending or  interest arrears.  Various plans for dealing with  the debt
overhang, including  the Brady Plan announced on March 10, 1989, were widely  characterized as
inadequate to restore access to international  capital markets.  Some observers, in fact, predicted
that debtor countries  might not return to private international  capital markets for a generation.2
Today the recovery in real economic activity and capital formation in debtor countries is
just beginning,  but a financial  recovery is well under  way.  These countries have experienced  very
large private capital inflows, real exchange rate appreciation, stock market booms, and dramatic
increases in the prices of their extemal debt (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1992).  In some
cases capital inflows have been associated with a return to resource transfers to these countres
similar  to those recorded in the 1970s as measured by the emergence of sizable balance of trade
deficits.
Do we understand enough about the 1982 crisis to predict that renewed accumulation  of
external debt can avoid a repeat of  1982 and the considerable costs that followed for debtor
countries? Unless the memories of investors  and residents of debtor countries are very short, they
must believe  that there is a difference  in the expected outcome of this new round of intemational
investment.  Is the debt crisis dead, as suggested by several observers recently?  Or is it only
sleeping?
See -implementation of the Brady Plan," US Senate (1990) for several prominePt economist  views that Brady
restructuring would have little effect on the outlook for debtor counties' access to international  credit markets.2
To understand this turnaround in market access it is necessary  to identify  the main factors
that can account  for the remarkable  improvements  in debtor countries' creditworthiness. We firt
argue that secondary market prices for syndicated  credits are a useful measure of marker access.
We then show that changes in international  interest rates, and induced changes in real exchange
rates and real domestic interest rates in debtor countries, can account for alt of the improvement
in secondary market prices after the first round of Brady Plan restructuring agreements in early
1990. The empirical  relationship  between secondary market prices and international  interest rates
is robutct  to changes in model specification  and to the tim  period considered- In particular, the
dominance  of international  interest rates holds both before 1989, when yields on sovereign  credits
rose over time (prices declined),  and after 1989 when yields geneamlly  declined (prices rose).
This is further confirmed  by recent developments  outside the period of our estimations. After this
paper was prepared, during February and March 1994 US interest rates increased substantially
while secondary  market prices dramatically  declined3
T'he decline in  real long term  interest rates  on  dollar denominated debt  is certainly
reversible, -and,  in fact, it might very well1  be reversed in the next year or so.  If domestic real
interest razes in debtor countries were to rise also and real exchange rates decline, as would be
nonzmal,  many developing  countries  would  probably again experience  debt servicing  difficulties.
- In the next section the relationship  between capital inflows and secondary market prices is
developed further.  In  section 3 a  simple model of  secondary market prices is proposed and
estimated.  Section 4 applies these estimates to  an "average" Brady plan country in  order to
evaluate the source of recent capital inflows. Section 5 summarizes  the results.
3The ten-year US Treasury bond rate increased by about 15%, from 5.7%  to06.6%  per year. while the market price
index fell by a similar  proportion.3
2.  Capital  Infows and Secondary  Mtarket  Prices
The secondary market price of debt is a useful barometer  for the climate for private capital
inflows to a debtor country because it reflects both private investors' expectations  concerning the
ability of debtor governments to  service existing debts and yie'Ids  on  alternative international
investments. The secondary market price is a sensitive indicator because it is established in an
active market for a relatively  homogeneous financial  instrument. Furthermore it is also more up
to date and accurate than private capital flow data-usefful  properties for an indicator.
Rising  secondary  market prices (falling  yields)  suggest that residents of the debtor country
can also issue new debt or equity on better terms.  The important implication  for understanding
recent capital inflows is that a larger volume  of new borrowing, or sales of equity, can credibly  be
serviced at lower yields.  Thus, an improvement  in secondary market prices was a precondition
for recently observed private capital inflows to debtor countries. Moreover, a return of secondary
markets to  levels reached in  1989 would 3ertainly stop  and probably reverse recent capital
inflows. While several recent papers have attempted to  directly explain private capit.d inflows,
this has proven to be a difficult  task.  The fact that private  inflows  have been offset by officia
outflows, generally  in the form of increases in intarnational  reserve assets, makes the existence  of
a stable relationship  between expected yields and private capital flows unlikely. Different policy
reactions over time clearly contaminate  reduced form relationships  between expected yields and
private capital flows. For this reason we focus on the expected yield required to induce investors
to hold existing debt as the best proxy for the terms on which residents of emerging markets can
issue  new debt  and equity.
There are two fnaetlreasons  for changes in the terms on which investors hold new
and existing  claims on residents of developing  countries. The firt  is changes  in yields available on
alternative  investments  measured in this paper by an appropriate risk-free dollar interest rate. The
second is a change in investors' evaluation of thie  credit risk peculiar to the developing  country. 4
4For  a formal  model  of  capital  inflows  adjusting  to  equalize  alternative  yields  see  Fernadez-Arias  (1993).4
While easily observed secondary market prices undoubtedly reflect other factors such as the
relative status  of government and private debt, our working hypothesis is that  the value of
sovereign debt is closely related to  investors' overall assessment of  the outlook for expected
returns on existing and new investments in the debtor country relative to expected returns on
alternative investments  (Dooley  et al., 1990).
3.  Quantitative  Evaluation  of Factors  Affecting  Secondary  Market  Prices.
While there have been a number  of recent commentaries  on the end of the debt crisis, it is
interesting that there have been relatively few quantitative  analyses  of what went right. While it is
natural for disasters to get more attention as compared to fair weather, a careful evaluation of
recent developments  can help evaluate the durability  of the improvement in the situation. In this
section we discuss measures of  five factors that might explain secondary market prices for
developing country debt: (a) Debt reduction; (b) Economic Policy Reform; (c) International
interest Rates; (d) Domestic Interest Rates; and (e) Exchange Rates
3a.  Debt  Reduction
A simple model for secondary market prices sets the market price equal to the ratio of
expected present value of debt service payments to the contractual value of outstanding  debt. It
follows that secondary market prices rise when the numerator,  expected payments,  rises relative
to the denominator, the contractual  value. Consequently,  these prices are linked to country
creditworthiness. 5 Debt or debt service reduction is expected to increase the price if the present
5
The relationship between  prices and country risk is distorted in some of the instruments used in Brady operations
by two factors, however. First, in the numerator, collateral enhancements increase the value of those instruments.
Second. in the denominator, below-market  interest rates such as in Brady par bonds, amounts to a lower effective
cantractual value.  These two biases counteract each other and may conceivably  offset in the case of par  bonds,
which would  justify the usual practice of using par bond prices. In general, however,  they do not offset each other
and  need to  be adjusted to  obtain  the  so-called stripped prices,  whose level  would better  reflect country
creditworthiness  (See  Table 2 for details). In practice, the changes in these stripped prices can be approximated  by
the changes in the prices of floating-rate instruments.5
value of expected paymnents  does not fall proportionately  with the reduction in the contr-actual
value of the debt.6 As documented  by Bacha (1992)  and World Bank ('1993),  increases  in debt
prices since the announcement  of the Brady Plan in 1989  have been larger for Brady Plan
countries as compared to other debtor countries (Figure 1).
Figure  1
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Brady countries  refer to Argentina,  Costa Rica, the Philippines,  Mexico, Nigeria, Uruguay and Venezuela
Non-Brady  countries refer to Albania, MIgeria.  Angola. Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria. Cameroon, Congo. Cote d'Ivoirc, Ecuador.
Jamaica.  Jordan, Morocco.  Panama  Peru,  Poland, Syria, Chile, Egypt, Honduras,  Hungary, Nicaragua and Senegal.
Source: S;almon  Bros..  IFIC LDC Debt Report, and World  Bank d4arn
There is much less agreement concerning the quantitaive importance of debt reduction.
The initial skepticism  about the Brady Plan on thie  part of many academiic  economists was based
on a smle  argument. The Plan was voluntay in the sense that banks would not be forced to
exchange their existing claims  for new claims with a lower  expected market value. The implication
was that debt reduction would be expensive in the sense that private debt retired by the Brady
Plan would be purchased at a price higher than the market price that would prevail if the Plan
See Dooley  (1988) for a general discussion of boybacks and markcet  prices.6
were not implemented.  As pointed Out  in Dooley (1988), such price can be expected to reflect the
market value of debt remaining  after the agreement was implemented  if banks can free-ride as in
open-market  buybacks. If the banks were in a less strong bargaining  position, the price would be
lower -and  more debt reduction would be possible for the same amount of resources, but always
limited by the banks' voluntary  participation  constraint.
Given  -these constraints it is possible to calculate the range of debt reduction that would
result given the resources available to support the deal.  As shown by Claessens, Diwan, and
Femnandez-Arias  (1992), Brady operations led to  prices and debt reduction falling within the
theoretical  ranges.
Table 1 provides a summary  of the debt reduction obtained  by various countries. Column
1 shows debt retired as measured by the reduction in the present value of debt service obligations.
Debt  reduction  reflects  reductions  of  contractual  debt  and  interest  service  as  well  as
collateralizatuon  and new money promises.  For example, in agreements where below-market
interest rates on collateralized  par Brady bonds were exchanged for old floating rate debt, we
calculate the difference in the present value of the debt service obligations  of the two bonds on the
exchange day assuming  that each would be serviced in full as contracted. The methodology used
is almost identical  to the one used in Claessens,  Diwan and Fernandez-Arias  (1992), where the
reader is referred for details. 7
Thbe  only difference is the  treatment of additional new money, whose negative effect on  debt reduction is
estimated as a fr-action  of its nomiinal  value (the fraction being the ex-ante price).  Since new money prmnises on
the part of banks were often conditional on countries serving interest over a period of time (not a sure thing in the
absence of the deal as reflected  in low prices), this estimation is probably better.7
Table 1
Debt  and Debt  Service  Reduction
Of  which
Addlidoam
Commuera  Bank  Debt  Net  Paymeonts  OMchid  Overall  Debt  keducion
Countrioe  Rcducllon  Eivalent  to  Ranke  Loaom  FAuvnloi  DhIN  Prices
us1$  PNrcenof  US$  mIllion  UJs$  million  US$  million  Peremni  of  Pro-rady  Post
maillion  Commeracia  TOWa  Debi  (cents)  Operation
Banlk  Debt  Sthipped
(cents)
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5) a (l)-(4)
N4eui9c03  40  6,1  3,3  .0  1  6  36  51I
*Mhllppimnc  3.553  54  1.451  154  3,399  1  2  40  76
costaRIMi  1,166  73  225  177  999  21  1  2  ______
Venezela  5,153  27  1.19687  4.466  14  37  59
uroum,y  907  so  413  140  667  15  56  73
Nigeria  4.221  79  l.611l  0  42114  2  1  45
Are  ua10.723  37  3 732  2117L  8,606  14  lB8  63
Total  44,~~~M656  40  16,263  7.00  37.649  is  31  571
()Completed  in two phases.
Source:  Claessenu,  Diwan and Femnandez-Arias  (1992) and  audhors'  calculation
Column 3 shows the net payment received by commercial  banks.  This cash was used to
purchase collateral  for new bonds or more directly for buybacks,  but in general the reduction in
the  contratual  present value of debt  was largely independent of  the  financial engineering
involved. These calculations  indicate that the amount of resources devoted to the agreements  are
more than a thir-d  of the reduction in the contracted present value of private debt. Substantial
additional  official  lending partially  offset the reduction  in commercial  bank debt. Column 4 shows
the  dollar  amount  of  additional loans  made  to  the  debtor  government  by  international
organizations and creditor goverr.ments  to support the Brady Plan. Thus the wt debt reduction is
lower and represents only 15 percent of total debt (columns  5 and 6).  It is not difficult  to see why
many doubted that this level of debt reduction would be decisive in reestablishing  access to capital
markets.8
One way to evaluate the direct effects of debt and debt service reduction on secondary
market prices is to analyze the  market  price of debt remaining  after the restructuring.  Because
prices of various instruments  are distorted by various features and attachments,  such as collateral,
new money  promises and below-market interest rates, column 8 shows stripped prices, that is the
priccs right after the operation adjusted for these distortions. 8 These prices are a good indication
of  the market view on  country creditworthiness once the benefits of  the operation are fuly
factored in.
If future repayments to  commercial  banks are positively linked to  the country's future
performance,  then the efficiency  gains of these DDSR operations can be gauged by analyzing  the
impact of the operation on prices. In fact, in the absence of efficiency  gains, in proportional terms
(snripped)  prices would not be expected to increase beyond the decrease in commercial  bank debt
(column 2).  As pointed out by Dooley et. al. (1990), a full evaluation of the impact of debt
reduction on the value of remaining private debt should consider the relative semnirty of the
various types,  of debt and the probability that the debtor would have received the loans for another
purpose.  If all creditors have the same implicit seniority and share the net present value of
repayments  in proportion to exposure, a hypothesis  consistent  with the findings  in Demidrguc-Kunt
and Fernandez-Arias  (1992) and in Bulow, Rogoff and Bevilaqua  (1992), then in the absence of
efficiency  gains (stripped)  prices would not increase beyond the decrease in total debt (column 6).
Any excess price increase  over the no efficiency  gain benchmark  could then be safely  attributed to
efficiency  gains!
Unfortunately, the  task  of  estimating the  increase in  prices due  to  the  operation is
extremely difficult  because the appropriate  counterfactual  price, the price prevailing  in the absence
8Like the calculation of debt reduction equivalent, the methodology  for estimating stripped prices is taken from
Claessens,  Diwan, and Fernandez-Arias  (1992), except with respect to the impact of additional new money.
9But  purely empirical results should deal with the theoretical implications explored in a recent study by Bulow,
Bogoff and Zhu (1994), which suggests very low  effi-ciency  gains.9
of the operation, is not observable. Long before.  the operation was consummated  prices reflected
the  market  expectations  on  the  outcome  of the  future  operation,  which  contaminate  the  observed
prices to  an unknown extent.  For  example, if  the  last  price quoted  before the  operation
incorporates a perfect forecast of the operation, its comparison with the stripped price does not
provide  any meaningful informnation  on the effects of a given operation.
Prices  before the  Br-ady announcement in  March  1989 may not  be  subject to  this
contamination but do  not reflect the changes in fundamentals  over the period leading to  the
operation date.  For this reason, results based on these prices (shown in column 7) need to be
taken with caution.  Nevertheless, as analyzed in the next section, the evidence shows that the
only important fnaetlwith  significant  variation that was identified  is international interest
rates after 1990.  Therefore, except for the recent operations, espec-ially  Argentina, estimations
and inferences  made on this  basis appear reasonable.
3b.  Economic  Policy Reform
A second important aspect of the Brady Plan agreements was the conditionality  associated with
*the  official  credit. It is plausible  that the conditionality  associated  with the Brady Pl'an  agreements
explains the increased market value of existing debt and the, turnaround in access to external
markets. It is even more difficult  to quantify the effects of economic  reform on market valuations
of external debt, but  it certainly appears that policies changed for the better  in Brady Plan
countries.  The widespread adoption of mark-et  oriented reform programs along with aggressive
fiscal reform may have been an additional important channel through which the Brady Plan
workouts improved the financial  position of debtor countries.  It is perhaps not surprising that
creditor governments emphasized  this aspect of the Plan.,  exante  u  tmyhv  enasrrs
that  some of  the  debtor  countries implemented fiscal reform changes  as  consistently and
aggresively as they have.  This suggests that the impact of fiscal reforms were not fully  credible
at the time of the exchanges. Perhaps the effect of improved fiscal policies  on secondary marketI0
prces  may have been gradually  incorporated into market prices in countries where the reform in
fact occurred. One  measure of  a  number of  important policy changes is  the  increase in
government revenue net of expenditures other than debt service - - what is usually called the
primary fiscal surplus. 10 As shown in Table 2,  some Brady Plan debtors have made very
impressive  progress in placing their budgets on a basis where considerable  debt service payments
can be financed through  taxation rather thin additional  borrowing.
TABLE 2
Primary Fiscal Surplus (PFS)  and Operational  Fiscal Surplus (OFS)
(Pretof  GDP)___
______________  ~~~~1935  1986  19B7  1933  1939  199  191__
Mexico  FF5  3.9  2.2  5.8  8.1  j8.4  7.16  3.  87
OFS  -3.3  -7.0  1.8  -3.6  -1.7  2.3  6.7  6.0
Argernina  FF5  0.3  1L8  -0.9  -1.0  -6.3  1.6  3.5  3.8
___________  (IOFS  -6.0  -4.7  -5.6  -6.3  -2139  -239  -0.2  1.5
BDzi  PFF5  2.1t  0.6  -218  -0.5  -0.5  2.  1.0  2.5
___________  (IOFS  -4.3  -3.6  -5.7  -4.8  -6.9  1  3  -2.2  -2.2
Vecnezcea  PFF5  4.7  039  -1.1  -6.1  3.3  6.1  7.1  -0.5
OFS  -0.2  -939  -3.6  -9.9  -1.0  2.1  3-5  -4.5
Nigei  PFS  437  2.6  2.4  -0.1  5.5  6.5  5.8  on
___________  (IOFS  -1.8  -5.4  -4.3  -5.9  0.5  0A  0.2  an
Otile  PFF5  0.6  0-5  2.5  6.6  75  5s0  2.2  na
___________  ~OFS  -2.9  -6.0  -1.0  -61'.2  3.1  1.'0  -1.2  a
Morocco  PFF  0.7  1.2  1.2  2.2  1.8  5.6  5.0  in
______________  OFS  -5.5  -6.8  -2.6  -1.1  -1.4  2.1  1.5  an
Philippins  PFF5  2.4  -1.3  2.7  3.2  IA4  1.1  1.0  m
._____________  (IFS  -2.1  -6.1  -0.7  -0.1  -1.6  -2.7  -3.0  a
Source:  Golman  Sachs  (1991.  1992.
Another useful measure of fiscal performance is the operational  budget balance.  This is
the primary surplus  less real interest payments on both domestic and external debt  Improvements
in this surplus  relative to the primary surplus are causedby a fall in domestic  or international  real
interest rates or a  fall in the  stock of debt.  The impressive  improvement of the operational
balances in Table 2 reflects the combined impact  of all of these factors.
10 Proceeds  from privatization  are included as a revenue..hmprovement  in operational balance has been much more pronounced compared to  the
improvement  in the primary balance. One of the important  challenges  for evaluating the future is
to identify  what part of the reduction in real interest payments is a permanent part of the debtor
countries' positions. One aspect that is clearly  permanent  is real debt amortization. A surplus for
this operational budget balance for past years means that the real value of' outstanding debt is
being reduced.  As shown in Table 3,  some debtor countries have made substantial gains in
reducing the real value of their net government debt through a normal amortiztion  of domestic
and foreign debt.  For some countries this has been more important than the debt reduction
discussed above.  It is also possi'ble  that the fiscal reform wil generate a permanent reduction in
the default premnia  incorporated  in interest rates.
Table 3
Public  Debt  Ratio
L____  a Perent  of GD
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  199  199  1992
Hungary  ~42.5  4637  51j.9  52.6  55.5  54.0  NA  NA
Poland  43.2  4835  67.2  65.0  73.0  88.9  NA  NA
Philivvines  57.6  69.5  76.6  73.5  67.3  71.7  NA  NA
Morocco  137.1  1275  136.3  125.3  117.3  105.2  NA  NA
Nigeria50.1  88.2  133.6  118.7  113.3  114.3  NA  NA
Argentina  72.2  78.6  89.9  95.9  112.3  94.3  68.5  62.0
Brazi  50.6  48.0  48.7  45.6  42.2  40.1  47.1  46.5
Chile  76.9  85-6  83.7  67.7  52.2  39.8  NA  NA
Mexico  .51.9  592  54.5  61.7  56.1  43.5  35.0  25.0
Venczuela  41.2  59.9  54.6  53.8  70.4  :54.1  46.3  :52.0
Note: Domestic  and external  indebtedness  of the public sector minus official  reserves.
Source: Goldman Sachs  (199). 1992J
It is much less clear, however, that the real interest rates paid on remaining debt will
remain at their current levels over the next few years. We turn to the complex  and interdependent
roles of domestic and inteheational  interest rates in the next two subsections.12
3c.  Intemational  Interest Rates
Another potential source of improvement in debtor countries' positions has been the
change in the external environment  The dominant change after 1989 was a fall in nominal and
real interest rates in the US and other major industrial  countries (Figure 2).  The role of interest
rates is interesting for a number  of reasons.  First, as shown in Dooley and Stone (1993) the rise
in international  interest rates is the only variable in a regression analysis  that has much power in
explaining the widespread decline in  secondary market prices through  1989.  This result is
consistent  with the hypothesis  that the expected present value of payments by debtor countries fell
as internatonal interest rates rose.  Thus, the xise in debt prices after the Brady speech would be
consistent with the observed fall in market interest rates.
Figure  2
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The potential importance  of the fall in international  interest rates arises from two sources.
First, there are good theoreticaC  reasons to believe that the value of both fixed and floating  rate
Brady bonds should rise more than proportionally  to percentage declines in international  interest
rates.  Second, domestic interest rates paid by debtor govermnments  should fail with international
rates and there are good theoretical reasons to  predict that the reduction will be more than
proportional.
To evaluate the effects of changes in international  interest rates it is necessary  to identify  a
relevant  "discount rate"  at  which  investors translate  expected payments  from the  debtor
government  into a present value. Since most of the external debt is denominated in US dollars, the
appropriate discount rate is  a  risk-free real interest rate  available on  a dollar denominated
investment  that is similar  in terms of maturity and in the ternms  on which the contractual interest
rate is adjusted over time. Th  iis is not a straightforward problem.- In particular it would at first
seem natural to compare floating  rate sovereign  debt to floating  rate risk free debt.  The problem
with this approach is that.  for risk free floating rate instruments, changes in market interest rates
alter the nominal  value of expected payments in future time periods. But this is exactly offset by
the change in the discount rate so that the present value of these payments is unchanged.
Wvith  floating rate sovereign credits that trade at a considerable  discount the effect of a
change in real risk free rate is quite different. Assuming  that the change in the real risk fr-ee  rate
does not change the government's  ability  or wilingness to pay, the value of expected payments in
future time periods does not change.  It follows that the present value of these payments  does
change.  Thus, both  floating rate  sovereign credits (and stripped prices) respond to  a faUl  in
international  interest rates in a manner usually  associated with fixed  rate long term bonds. To the
extent  that repayments are shared by foreign creditors in proportion to contractual debt service,
the response of fixed-rate sovereign credits would be even more pronounced because it would
inaease  its share.14
If future payments are expected to grow over time, as can be expected in a growing
economy,  then the increase  in their present value would be proportionally  larger than the decrease
in the risk-free rate. Furthermore,  if the foreign  debt is lower in priority of payment  to other types
of debtor government  expenditure,  secondary market prices would tend to rise by more than the
percentage increase  in the present value of  total expected  payments.
This  is  a  potentially important  aspect  in  understanding the  relationship between
international interest  rates  and  secondary market  prices.  Unlike  substantially risk-free
instruments,  a fall in the discount rate increases  the present value of both floating  and fixed rate
debt of over-indebted  countries. Preliminary  evidence of the relative performance  of floating  and
fixed rate Brady bonds indicates that investors consider default on both bonds equally likely  and
that market prices of both types of bonds respond to changes in the discount rate as if they were
fixed rate instruments.
3d.  Domestic  Interest  Rates
A change in international interest rates is probably reinforced by changes in domestic
interest rates.  Most intemal debt is roiled over several times a year in debtor countries, and so
real debt service  payments are very sensitive  to changes in domestic  real interest rates.  This is an
interesting part of these governments'  expenditures  because, relative to real interest payments to
foreign creditors, real interest rates paid on their domestic debt show a much higher variance and
much higher average levels before 1990. Although internal  debt is typically  smaller than external
debt  for these countries, changes in ex post real  domestic interest payments have been an
important component  of total debt service costs.
A rise in domestic debt service payments should, for a given overall capacity to  pay,
reduce expected payments on external debt and in turn lower secondary market prices for extemal
debt. If changes in international  interest rates generate qualitatively  similar  changes in domestic15
rates, as would  be expected  if capital  markets are at all integrated,  this would  clearly  reinforce  the
effect  of international  interest  rates on secondary  market prices.
3e.  Exchange  Rates
The  potential  importance of  the  real  exchange  rate  of  the  debtor  country  is
straightforward.  Government revenue in domestic currency can cover greater debt  service
payments if the foreign currency value of revenues rises, as happens when the local currency
appreciates. Other  things  being equal, the real appreciation  of debtor country currencies  shown  in
Figure 3 increased  the dollar value of government  revenues devoted to external debt service. As
withL  the ocher variables  discussed  above, the relevant measure of the real exchange rate is that
expected to prevail over the life of the contract.  For lack of a better prediction  we can take the
current value as an unbiased,  but certainly  poor, prediction  of its future values. As with domestic
interest rates  it is  also important to  consider the relationship between exchange rates and
international  interest rates.  Capital  inflows  associated  with low international  interest rates induce
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A Simple Model of Price Changes since March  1989
The arguments  developed  above suggests  the following  regression  hypothesis:
Pi=  ac + PiL7X. +  yLTG.  +SRCT.t  + r  +  t  +  u
where
t = 1, 2,..., T is the time index;
i = 1, 2,..., N is the country  index;
p is the logarithm of secondary  market prices;
LTX is the logarithm  of the ratio of total long-term debt to exports;
LTG is the logarithm of the ratio of total long-term debt to GNP;
RCT is the logarithm of the ratio of commercial  debt to total long-term  debt
r is the logarithm  of the long-run (10 year) US interest rate;
t is a time trend component
c is the common  constant term;
ai are the country specific intercept  terms and
u is the usual error term.
As shown in Dooley and Stone (1993) conventional  regressors  for secondary  market
prices such as the debt export and debt GDP ratios, measures  of the composition of debt and
fiscal variables  explain cross section differences  in prices from 1986  through 1990. But the
international interest rate is the dominant determinant  of the time series  behavior  of prices. An
important reason to doubt this result is a clear common  trend for prices and interest rates over the
1986  -89 time period. In this paper we extend the sample time period to 1992, a period in which
there was a clear reversal in the trend for both interest rates and prices. Results reported in Table
4 summarize  panel regressions  for annual  data for 21 developing  countries  over the 1986 to 1992
time period. Results for six countries  for which we have data for fiscal balances are reported in
table 5. (See Appendix for details on data and econometric methods).1  8
Table 4: Logarithm of Secondary Market  Ptices
(Full  sample,  1986-1992)
Variable  (fl(2
LTX  -0.50  -0.75
_______________  (-310)  5p  4
LTG  -0.36  -0.32
_______________  (-2.30)  240
RCr  0.09  -0.11
r  -0.87  -1.70
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (-3~~.17)  661
t  -0.16
C  5.67  7.91
_________________(8.70)  (12.35)
_____________  ~0.36  0.53
Adi 1  0.22  0.43
Note: t-ratio in parenthesis.
See Appendix  for more information.
Table 5
Logarithm of Secondary Market Prices
(Reduced  Sample,  1986-1992)
TX  ~~-0.30  -0.23  -0.24  -0.24
.(0.16)  .. <  (0.19)  0.19) 
LTG3  0.22  0.20  0.22  0.20
Vae(0.14)  (0.16)  )(0.15)
RCr  -0.05  -0.06  -0.07  -0.05
(0.14)  (0.14)  0
r  -2.66  -2.57  -2.61  -2.58
_____  (0.47-  ((0.4)  7)0.48)
LPFS  -0.03  0.32
(1.19)  -(0.50)
LOFS  0.33  0.37
- (A*0.74)  (0.80)43  _________
Note:  LPFS  and  LOFS  are positive  transformations  of PFS  and  OFS  (prirsmy  and
operational fiscal surpluses) as a frawtion  of debt outstanding.
Standard  deviation  in  parenthesis.  See  Appendix  for  irftirination.19
For the lar-ger  sample  (Table 4) the conventional  measures  of debt relative to the economic
resources avaiable to service the debt have the expected signs and ar'e statistically  significant  at
conventional levels.  These  variables presumably capture the  impact of  debt  reduction and
improvements  in the debt service capacity of the debtor country.  We also tested the importance
of dummy variables often utilized in this literature to capture the effect of the announcement  of
loan loss reserves by some US banks in 1986 and the announcement  of the Brady plan in  1989.
These variables were not significant  and did not  affect the results when a simple time trend to
reflect the gradual settlement of the  negotiation enviromnment  during the debt crisis was also
included.
Eor the  smaller sample of countries,' table 5, the basic model is  less satisfactory and
inclusion of the primary fisal  surplus does not imnprove  the statistical properties of the basic
model and is not a significant  variable. This is consistent with results reported in Dooley and
Stone (1993).
Our primary interest however is on the size and stability of the interest rate effect.  As
shown in table 4, for the larger sample the interest rate has the expected negative sign and is near
the expected value of a negative unit elasticity. That is a one percent change in the long term US
Treasury bond interest rate, for example from 5 percent-to 5.05 percent, generates about a one
percent fall in market price. Moreover, if we add a time trend to the-  regression  the effect of the
interest  rate variable increases and is considerably  more peilyestimated.
To test the robustness of this result we also divided the sample into two time periods
-roughly  corresponding to the period of generally  rising prices before 1989 and generally  rising
prices thereafter (Table 6).  Again the interest elasticity has the expected sign and is statistically
significant,  although the absolute size of the elasticity in the earlier time period is implausibly
large.  While the interest elasticity is -4.91 in the 1986-1989.period, it is.-O.7  for the period
1989-1992. This discrepancy  can perhaps  be explained  in terms of an omitted  increasing  investor-
20
pessimism,  biasing that elasticity downwards when interest rates made a negative contribution
(1986-1989) and upwards when interest rates made a positive contribution (1989-1992).  Such
interpretation  is further confirmed  by the overall  estimated elasticity  of -1.70 when a time dummy
is included (Table 4).  What appears clear, however, is that interest rates exerted a substantial
effect in the expected direction during both phases.  This is reassuring because interest rates
increased in the first period and declined in the second  period.
Table  6:  Logarithm  of Secondary  Market  Prices
(Full Sample)
Variablc  1986-1989  1989-1992
LIX  -.071  -0.4B
C-3.76)  (-2.47)
LTG  -.053  -0.55
(W3.13)  (-3.24)
RCI  -0.20  -0.07
{-1.47)  (-0.55)
r  4.91  -0.75
{-9.25)  (-3.24).
C  13.96  4.96
(12.01)  (8.01)
R2  0.73  052
AdjR 2 0.61  0.33
Note:  t-ratios in parenthesis.
See  Appendix  for  more  infbrnarion.
Our interpretation  of this evidence is that changes in intemational  interest rates have had
an important influence  on market prices of existing debt of developing  countries and, in tum, on
the reentry of residents of these countries  to international  credit markets. 11
Thc remarkably parallel evolution of prices in Brady and non-Brady countries shown in Figure  I  further
confinrs the notion that the international  interest rates are the key underlying  factor.21
4.  A Simulation Exerise.
In this section  we use the results  reported  in the previous  section  to assess  the importance
of interest rate changes  and other factors to the evolution  of secondary  market  prices for a
composite  "Brady  Plan"  country.
The econometric  results  support  the use  of the following  simplified  model  for  country  i:
Pit  = (ci*Bio/rt  where  Bit=(xit)½2  (git)4h
(x and g being  the exports-to-debt  and GNP-to-debt  ratios). This simple  model has a unitary
interest  rate elasticity  and is homogeneous  in the country  specific  variables  exports, GNP and
debt. 12
A more concrete  assessment  of the factors discussed  above can be generated  by this
simple  model. For the purpose  of illustration,  the Brady  deals  concluded  in 1990-1992  (Mexico,
Philippines,  Phases I and IIH  Venezuela,  Costa Rica, Nigeria and Uruguay)  are combined. 13
Consider  this "average"  Brady country  in March 1989  when the broad outline  of the plan was
presented  to the market  in a speech  delivered  by Secretary  Brady. The contractual  value  of the
outstanding  commercial  bank  debt was about  $81 billion  and the average  market  price  was about
$0.35.  Total  extemal  debt was about $196  billion. The reduction  in contractual  value  of the debt
generated  by the completed  deals  as measured  by the debt  reduction  equivalent  was about  $34
120ne implication  of this result  is that what matters  fbr  the price  of commercial  bank  debt  is total debt  rather  than
commercial  bank debt  This is similar to findings  in other empirical  studies,  for example,  Bulow,  Rogoff  and
Bevilaqua  (1992). We stop short of concluding  from that evidence  that all creditors  are equally  scnior,  however,
because  this condition  is necessary  but not sufficient  unless  restrictive  burdensharing  models  are assumed  (for a
discussion,  see Demirguic-Kunt  and Fernandez-Arias  (1992).
13 The Argentina operation is  not included because,  as noted above, its analysis is  complicated  by the
inapplicability  of pre-Brady  prices  as benchmarks.  While  these  pwoblens  are also present  to some  extent in other
Brady  operations,  the  size of the  Argentina  operation  may  significantly  distort  the  average.22
billion  in commercial  bank debt and a total net debt reduction of about  $29 billion. The stripped
price of the  remaining commercial  bank debt immediately  after the  restructuring was about
$0.54.14
The expected present value of payments  to commercial  banks after the restructuring  can
be estimated  as the stipped price times the debt equivalent  outstanding,  about $26 billion. "Pre-
Brady" value of commercial  bank debt was about $29 billion. This simple  caiculation  suggests
that if the expected value of official  debt was unchanged,  the initial  market reaction to the Brady
plan focused on the debt reduction but did not generate a measurable  revision of expectations
about the payments on the debt that could be clearly associated with efficiency  gains.  This
interpretation  is consistent  with the view that official  creditors  are senior to the banks.
Alternatively,  the hypothetical assumption can be  made that all creditors are equally
senior.  (Notice that this assumption  is consistent with the simplfied model where prices depend
on total debt, rather that commercial  bank debL)  In that case pre-Brady and stripped prices
would apply to total debt.  Under this assumption,  the total expected present value of payments
increased  from about $69 billion  in the absence  of the operation  to $92 billion  after the operation.
This would suggest that in the market's  view Brady operations  entail effects that go beyond the
arithmetic  effect of debt reduction.
For the purpose of this paper, the important points are: i) whatever the improvements
brought  about by the operations,  they are relatively  permanent  and therefore  Lnlikely  to contribute.
to a down-side  risk of falling  secondary  market prices, and ii) after the operations,  sovereign  risk
in these countries,  as measured  by stripped  prices,  remains substantial.
We now analyze  the evolution,  of the stripped price in the average  Brady "country"  after
the operations to show that improvements  thereafter can be filly accounted for by the decline  in
international  interest rates.  This implies  that, contrary to widespread  belief,  these improvements
14Computed  at the time of each country's  restructuring.23
in creditworthiness  need not be associated  with new positive  developments  in fundamentals  in the
domestic ec-onomy  or with the market learning that the benefits of the Brady operat-ions  were
larger than anticipated  as reflected  in the initial  market prices. At the completion  of the deals the
ten year US treaury  bond rate was 8.59 percent. In March 1993 the rate stood at 5.85  percent.
Other things beinig  equal, our simplified  model would predict that this worild generate a 46
percent rise in the secondary  market  price, from $0A43  to 0.63.15  The actual market price on May
8, 1993 was about $0.66. This is a disturbing  result.  For the average  Brady country virtually  all
the increae in secondary  market prices since the March 1989  can be accounted  for by the purely
arithmetic  effect of one permanent  factor, debt reduction,  and one reversible  factor, international
interest rates.
Moreover, the remaining  increas  in market prices can easily be accounted for by real
exchange  rate appreciations that averaged about 15 percent fwin March 1990 to March 1993,
specially  if the market expected  this to bne  a permanent  improvement The corresponding  increase
in GNP measured in dollars would lead the model to predict a rise in market prices of about
$0.03,  bringing the predicted  price to the actual  price of $0.66.
An interesting  possibility  is even this calcuation underestimates  the role of international
interest rates and that the rise in market prices can be overmplained  when the indirect beneficial
effect on growth (and therefore  the increase  in the exports and GNP ratios x and g) is taken into
account. It seems  quite likely  that the decline  in the dollar risk free interest rate also accouints  for
the  fall in  domestic real interest rates in  debtor countries.  As discussed above, a  fal  in
international  rates should  put downward  pressure on domestic  rates through  interest arbitrage. In
addition  each of these governments  pays a premium  to domestic  holders of public debt which in
many  cases reflects expected inflation  and exchange  rate depreciation. A change in international
'5We assume here that the expected  long run inflation rate for the United States did not change over this interval.
If expected inflation fell the predicted change in the price would  be less since in this case the dollar value of
expected paymex-nts  should increase.24
interest rates that casts doubt on the ability of the government  to  finance debt service without
resrting  to  the inflation tax could generate immediate  increase in nominal and real domestic
interest rates.  Thus, a rise in international  rates could generate even larger changes in domestic
real rates. If a rise in international  interest rates is associated  with a more than proportionate  rises
in domestic  rates, the possibility  of a large fall in secondary  market prices  is even more likely.
This suggests that policy reforms may not have been crucial for the "average" country.
The explanation  is that the change,  in the p4imn  fiscal  surplus for the "average"  country has been
strongly negative since 1989. As mentioned  above Mexico has managed a small increase in its
operational  surplus  since 1989  but this is more  tha  offset  by Venezuela.
It  is possible that the  impressive levels of primary surpluses and expectations about
improved  policies  have also  played an important  role in the observed  capital inflows. The difficult
question is whether or not these permanent factors could sustain market access if international
interest rates and secondary  mariket  prices fell to levels seen only three years ago.
It  could be argued that the volume of private capital -inflows  recorded in developing
countries is evidence  that the improved  outlook for these countries is robust to plausible  changes
in the economic  environment. After all, investors  are surely aware that inwxnational  interest rates
could rise. as the industrial countries recover.  The answer to  this may be that the volume of
private capital inflows is a poor indicator of expectations. In particular, we can think of the
debtor  country  government  as  offering  foreign  investors  short-termi, dollar-denominated
investments  that carry an interest rate far in excess of what can be currently  earned  in the creditor
countries.
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  debtor government  have again made the  mistake of
guarantceeig dollar-denominated  debts of their residents explicitly as they did wiLth  syndicated
credits.  In this case the exchange and credit guarantee are both implicit. The dominat  form of
private capital inflow  this time is a domestic  currency  claim on the debtor govermnment,  domestic
banks and other domestic firms.  The dollar value of these positions depends on  the debtor25
governments' commitment  to  defending an exchange rate with the dollar.  In many cases the
government's  commitment  is strong because it has based its inflation target on a fixed exchange
rate. In these circumstances  a devaluation  is seen as a major departure from the objective  of price
stability.
The government's  commitment  is, to some extent, credible because it has accumulated  a
substantial  war chest of reserves to be used to defend the exchange  rate policy. In recent years,
about one half of the private inflow to Latin American debtor countries has been matched by
increase  in official  reserves. Thus, the investor  has some comfort that the high domestic  currency
interest rate will also be a high dollar interest rate.  Moreover, by keeping inyestments  in the
banking  system  or  in  government  securities,  the  investor  has  some  assurance  that  these
investments  will be backed by the government  even if domestic  finns become  insolvent. This is ali
quite reminiscent  of the late 70's in that, as long as the pnvate capital flows in and the official
capital flows out,  there is no reason to  limit the size of the capital inflow.  In  effect the
govermment  is acting as a a financial  intermediary  that lends cheap and borrows dear.  The only
limiting factor on the volume of such a business  is the net worth of the intermediary.
Suppose  the  debtor  govermment let  the  exchange rate  be  determined  in  a  clean  float.
Would  private capital  inflows  continue  to be very large? Our guess is that they would not, and in
fact would not even match  the very large current  account  deficits now being recorded.
5.  Condusions
Secondary  market prices may be more informative  as a barometer of the financial  strength
of a debtor country as compared  to the volume  of observed  private capital inflows. A reversal in
US interest rates could generate real trouble for debtor countries, particularly  if it spreads to
domestic markets.  The related fall in secondary markets would signal a halt of recent capital
inflows,  rapid declines  in international  reserves  and exchange  rate depreciation.
Fiscal reform  has been impressive  in a few countries  but in general has not built the kind of26
cushion  into the finances  of most debtor countries  that could easily offset debt service payments
that would  result.  Moreover, additional  fiscal adjustment  might draw much less popular support
if it merely underpins  increased  service  paynto6ts.
There  have  been- important "permanent" improvements in  many debtors'  financial
positions.  Debt reduction, both through external debt restructuring and amortization  through
operationgl  budget balances,  has reduced the vulnerability  of a few debtor countries. Moreover,
permanent  reforms  of fiscal systems  have strengthened  the debt service ability  of some countries.
Neverthieless,  recent capital inflows have not been restricted  to countries with strong economic
adjustment programs. -Falling  dollar interest rates have dramatically  reduced secondary market
discounts,  and in many cases brought them close to zero (the limiting  situation  that characterizes
the unrestricted  access to markets of solvent sovereign  debtors). It seems likey that rising  dollar
interest rates could reverse  this situation.27
The investigation  covers the period 1986-1992 for 18 countries and 1988-1992  for three
countries for which secondary  market prices are available. The countries  considered starting in
1986 are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cowe  dIlvoire, Colombia, Costa  Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala,  Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua,  Nigeria, Panama,  Peru, Philippines,  Senegal,
Uruguay  and Venezuela. Because of lack of availability  of secondary  miarket  prices prior to 1988,
the following  three countries  have a reduced time pe-riod  (1988-1992):  Colombia,  Guatemala  and
Nigeria. Annual data were used because some of the relevant data are-not available at hiigher
fr-equencies.  This should alleviae serial auto correlation due to omnitted  variables.. The bulk of
the data for secondary  market prices come from Salomon  Brothers' (end-of-year  price).  World
interest rate is captured here by the long-run (10 year) US interest rate (Source:  International
Financial  Statistics  of the International  Monetary  Fund). Nominal  interest rates are used  because
of the difficulty  of estimating  long-term  ex-ante real interest rates.16 The other variables,  that is,
GNP, total long-term debt, c-ommercial  debt and export are extracted from the World Banks
World Debt Tables 1991-1992. Note that the 1992 figures for the latter variables  are projected
figures. The total long-term debt includes  interest arrears. Commercial  debt includes bond debt
and interet  arrears.
Econometric  Methods
T'he  statistical  procedure used in this panel sample was Generalized  Least Squares,  where
country-specific  intercepts were considered r-andom. To  the extent that random effects are
uncorrelated with the explanatory  variables, GLS estimators are consistent and efficient. This
hypothesis  was  tested  and  accepted  at  usual  confidence  levels  using  the  Hausman
misspecification  test.
16To  the  extent  tha they  are  correlated,  nominal  rates  are  suitable  proxies.  See  Femnandez-Arias  (1993)  for  a
justification.28
The homogeneity  implicit  in the use of the (log) ratios LTX, LTG and RCT was tested
and not rejected at the 95 percent confidence level in the context of  a more general model
involving  the (log of) exports,  GNP, commercial  debt stocks  and total debt stocks.
The robustness  of the result was tested by including  two time dummy  variables:  one to
reflect the general drop in secondary market pnces in 1987 following  a change in the reserve
policy  of Citibank  and another one to capture the anticipation  effect of the announcement  of the
Brady Plan in 1989. They were both insigaificant  when a time trend component was included  in
the specification.
Serial auto correlation does not appear to be a problem according to the Sargan-Frazini
test.  Correcting for autocorrelation using the Prais-Wimsten  transformation  introduces only
margal  changes  to the estimations  of interest29
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